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This paper compares the economic development of Korea and Japan during the past three 
millennia. In particular, it examines why, although the Korean economy was more advanced 
from around the six century B.C. to  around the sixth century A.D., Japan subsequently 
surpassed Korea in terms of economic development and the gap continued to widen during the 
Tokugawa period (1603–1867). It is argued that until the eleventh century, the economic gap 
between Korea and Japan can be largely explained by geography, while from the twelfth to the 
seventeenth century, differences in institutions, systems of economic integration, and human 
capabilities – all shaped by a divergence in political systems – played a key role in Japan’s 
catch-up with Korea.  
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The economic development of a country is determined by many factors, including 
geography, trade, culture, institutions, and so on. There has been considerable debate on what 
are the primary determinants of growth, with various hypotheses put forward based on new 
growth theory and cross-country evidence (see, e.g., Sachs 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, and 
Trebbi 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001·2005). The debate goes on and so far 
makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions. One reason seems to be that cross-country 
studies covering dozens of countries face difficulties in satisfactorily taking regional and 
historical contexts into account. I believe that a comparative historical study of a few well-
chosen countries can help to break the impasse in this debate. A good subject for such an 
approach is a comparison of Korea and Japan, because the two countries are similar in size, 
ecology, and culture, but differ in terms of their history.  
Of course, as geographically close neighbors, Korea and Japan also share many historical 
features. For example, they both developed pre-modern civilizations and agricultural societies, 
and now belong to the group of industrialized countries. However, there are also many ways in 
which their historical developments differ. For example, the political systems of the two 
countries diverged following the disintegration of the Japanese ritsuryo (횵) state
1 around the 
tenth century, which influenced economic institutions and performance. The Japanese economy 
grew faster than the Korean economy from the third century B.C. and caught up with it during 
the medieval period. In 1910 Japan colonized Korea. The extent to which the histories of two 
countries differ may come as a surprise, considering their close proximity and similar ecology, 
the active exchange between the two countries since pre-historical times, and the deep influence 
of pre-modern Chinese civilization on both countries.   
The Japanese economy has achieved three catch-ups. It first caught up with Korea, then 
China, and finally the Western countries. In this paper, I focus on the first stage of Japanese 
catch-up, which laid the foundation for the second and third stages. During the Tokugawa 
period, the Japanese economy surpassed the Korean economy, drew level with the economically 
                                                        
1 The ritsuryo state had been established in the seventh century based on the adoption of Chinese 
system of laws and administration.  
  1advanced regions of China, and laid the foundations for catching up with the Western countries 
during the twentieth century. The aim of this study is to elucidate this process and examine the 
underlying factors.  
The great divergence between East and West during the early modern period has attracted 
much academic attention (see, e.g., Landes 1998; Frank 1998; Pomeranz 2000; Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2005). Studying the divergence between Korea and Japan may shed 
some light on this subject, because Korea’s civilization during the Joseon
2 dynasty (1392-1910) 
resembled Chinese civilization more closely than that of any other country, while Japan shares 
certain characteristics with England, i.e., both are island countries located at the periphery of a 
continent with high levels of civilization. 
 
 
II. Trends in the economic gap between Korea and Japan  
1. A widening gap during the Tokugawa Period 
How can we measure the economic gap between Korea and Japan? The most commonly 
accepted yardstick is per capita GDP. Maddison (2003) provides per capita GDP statistics for 
many countries over a long time span. His and other estimates for Japan and Korea are shown in 
Table 1.    
 
Table 1: Korea’s and Japan’s per capita GDP (1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) 
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Sources: Maddison (2003, p.184); 1800 (L) from Lee (1999, p.64); 
     1934-6 (FMY) from Fukao, Ma and Yuan (2006), Fig 1.  
Note: 1. Confined to South Korea for the period after 1950. 
  2. The figures in parentheses are explained in the text. 
 
In an earlier study, I estimated that Japan’s per capita GDP around 1800 was about 30% 
higher than that of Korea (Lee 1999). My estimates put rice output in Korea and Japan around 
1800 at about 10 million koku (1 koku=4.96 bushels) and 24 million koku, and the population at 
                                                        
2 The Korean government made changes to the romanization of Korean words in 2000, for example 
Goryeo for Koryŏ and Joseon for Chosŏn. The present study employs the new romanization method.  
  2about 16.5 million and 30.7million, respectively.
3 In that study, I assumed that the proportion of 
rice output value in GDP during that period was similar in both countries, because the 
proportion of rice in agricultural output was lower in Korea than in Japan, but the proportion 
of agricultural output in GDP was higher.
4 
I assume that Korea’s per capita GDP in 1800 was about 600 dollars in 1800, for the 
following reasons. First, considering Korea’s level of economic development, its per-capita 
GDP in 1800 is unlikely to have differed much from the Asian average. Second, this seems a 
reasonable figure in light of the trend in per capita GDP since 1800, which will be discussed 
below.  
The economic gap between Korea and Japan widened during the nineteenth century.  It is 
highly probable that the productivity of paddy land in Korea declined in the early and mid-
nineteenth century, while that in Japan increased, as shown in Table 2. Since farm output, 
measured in units of koku of rice (췔), came mostly from the land, its trend provides a 
good reflection of land productivity. The downturn or stagnation of the Korean economy was 
reversed by the end of the nineteenth century following the opening of the economy to trade 
with the Western world and Japan, which had opened the door to the West earlier. However, the 
Japanese economy took off in the late nineteenth century. Ohkawa and Miyohei (1979) have 
argued that modern economic growth in Japan began in the late 1880s.  
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Source: Hayami and Miyamoto (1988, p.44). 
 
By how much did the gap widen during the period 1800-1911? According to recent estimates 
                                                        
3 It now seems to me that my earlier estimates slightly understate the rice output of Korea and Japan, 
and slightly overstate Korea’s population (Lee, forthcoming). However, my estimate of the gap in 
per capita GDP between Japan and Korea around 1800 remains unchanged. 
4 The proportion of rice output valued at market prices to GNP was 24% in Japan during 1885-8 
(Ohkawa and Miyohei 1979, Table A7 and A16), and that to GDP 27% in Korea during 1911-4 (Kim 
2006, Table I-1 and II-2). Relative to GDP, the proportion of rice output seems to have been similar 
in both countries around 1800, given that in the nineteenth century both GDP and rice output grew 
faster in Japan while the relative price of rice increased faster in Korea because of Korean rice 
exports to Japan.  
  3by members of the Naksungdae Institute of Economic Research (Kim 2006, p. 320), Korea’s per 
capita GDP in 1911 was 626 dollars. Based on their estimates (Kim 2006, pp. 353, 360), the 
growth rates of GDP and per capita GDP during 1912-4 were 6.1% and 4.3%, respectively. It is 
likely that these estimates are too high, however, because the Korean economy during this 
period appears to have been on the verge of entering into a stage of sustained growth. I therefore 
assume that the growth rate of Korea’s per capita GDP during 1912-4 was about 3%, which 
yields a safer estimate of per capita GDP in 1911 of 650 dollars. If we accept Maddison’s per 
capita GDP estimate for Japan of 1,356 dollars in 1911, then Japan’s per-capita GDP was about 
2.1 times that of Korea.  The gap in per capita GDP between Korea and Japan thus seems to 
have widened by a factor of about 1.6 during 1800-1911. 
Korea’s per-capita GDP appears to have decreased during the first half of the nineteenth 
century and increased from the end of the nineteenth century, for the following reasons. First, 
the productivity of paddy land declined during the first half of the nineteenth century, but then 
increased from the end of the nineteenth century (Rhee 2004). Second, the real value of 
international trade increased more than ten-fold during 1876-1911, stimulating economic 
development (Lee 2006, p.236). The gap in per capita GDP between Japan and Korea appears to 
have widened by about 20% during the period 1800-1872 given that per capita farm output in 
Japan increased by 15% during this time, as shown in Table 2. The gap continued to widen until 
around 1910.  
Maddison’s estimates of per capita GDP in Korea during the colonial period (1910-45) must 
be too high because his estimate for 1911 was too high. Fukao, Ma and Yuan (2006) have tried 
to correct Maddison’s estimates for 1934-36. However, they, in turn, seem to understate Korea’s 
per capita GDP in those years, because it must be higher than that in 1953 according to other 
estimates. If we assume that Korea’s per capita GDP in 1911 was 650 dollar and accept 
Maddison’s estimate of the growth rate of per capita GDP, then per capita GDP in 1934-36 must 
have been 1,024 dollars. If we use this figure, we end up with a reasonable trend in Korea’s per 
capita GDP during the mid-twentieth century, as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3:  Korea’s per capita GDP before and after the Second World War  
Year  Per capita net  
commodity product  
(1953 constant won) 
Per capita GDP 
(1990 international 
Geary-Khamis dollar) 













1,224    (1,024) 
1,442    (1,206) 
966 
1.77       (1.25) 






Sources: Per capita net commodity product is taken from Kim and Roemer (1979, p. 35, 
  4Table 20); per capita GDP in 1990 dollars is from Maddison (2003); figures in parentheses 
are explained in the text; per capita GDP in 1934-36 yen is from Mizoguchi and Noguchi 
(1996). 
 
Although it is difficult to exactly determine the gap in per capita GDP between Korea and 
Japan before 1950, trends in the gap can be inferred with some accuracy. The gap continued to 
widen during 1800-1910, did not change much during the colonial period, widened drastically 
after liberation from Japanese rule, and has narrowed sharply since 1970.  
While it may be safe, for convenience’s sake, to judge the level or performance of industrial 
economies solely in terms of per capita GDP, this is not the case when it comes to pre-industrial 
economies which rarely experienced sustained growth in per capita GDP due to population 
pressures. For instance, we should not infer that Japan’s economy contracted in the seventeenth 
century solely on the basis of the decrease in per capita farm output shown in Table 2, because 
during this period, both the population and land productivity increased. We therefore need to 
utilize an auxiliary yardstick, namely population density.  We also need to take development of 
technology and markets into account. 
Table 4 provides a comparison of the Japanese and the Korean economies around 1800. The 
figures suggest that the former had overtaken the later at this period. Not only per capita GDP, 
but also population density was higher in Japan than in Korea. There were also considerable 
gaps in the urbanization rate and the per capita money stock, which is sufficient to show that 
markets were more advanced in Japan. However, it should not be overlooked that Korea 
developed rural markets, as is shown by the higher density of periodic markets, which were held 
every five days. And the dependence on foreign trade was low in both countries. In both 
countries, the proportion of agricultural households was high and a large share of such 
households also had incidental incomes from off-farm work. Not only was the proportion of 
agricultural households lower in Japan than in Korea, they also had more ample opportunities 
for off-farm by-employments in commerce and industry (Nishikawa 1987). As will be explained 
in detail below, agricultural technology became more advanced in Japan than in Korea by the 
eighteenth century. In addition, Japan achieved dramatic progress in education from the end of 
the seventeenth century onward and came to surpass Korea both in terms of the number of 
schools and the proportion of educated people during the nineteenth century. Curricula in 
Tokugawa Japan became increasingly diversified and pragmatic, while those in Joseon Korea 
remained virtually unchanged.   
 
Table 4: Comparison of the Korean and Japanese economies around 1800 
 Korea  Japan 
Per capita GDP (1990 dollars)  600  700 
  5Population (million persons)  (persons/1 km
2) 
Proportion of agricultural households (%) 
Proportion of population living  
in cities of more than 10,000 (%) 
Number of periodic market   
Money stock/GDP (%) 
Trade volume/GDP  (%) 
Number of private elementary and middle schools 













Less than Korea 
20 
Less than 1 
Terakoya (?)  
5,000 
Sources: Statistics for Korea are from Lee (2006), pp. 54, 112-4, 119, 140, 153, 162. The 
proportion of Japan’s agricultural households is from Nishikawa (1987). The proportion of the 
Japanese city population is from Saito (2005).  
Note: 1. The money ratio for Japan is calculated, based on Iwahashi’s (2005) estimate that 
Japan’s per capita money stock was about ten times that of Korea. 
2. The trade ratios for Korea and Japan are explained in the text. 
3. The number of seodang for Korea is estimated based on a number of 16,540 in 1911 (Kimura 
1997) and the extent of the spread of education around 1800 (Lee 2006, p. 213).   
4. The number of terakoya for Japan is estimated based on a number of 13,816 in 1875 and the 
trend in its growth (Ishikawa 1985, pp. 143-8, 194). 
 
 
2. Japan’s catch-up with Korea  
Most advanced institutions and technologies in pre-modern East Asia originated in China. 
They spread eastward to Japan mainly via the Korean peninsula before the seventh century. 
Therefore, it is only natural that Korea developed an ancient civilization earlier than Japan. Both 
Korea and Japan were competent in absorbing Chinese civi1ization (Fairbank, Reischauer, and 
Craig 1978).  
Elements of advanced civilization transferred from China and Korea to Japan include the 
elaborate technology of paddy land cultivation, bronze and iron metallurgy, silk manufacturing, 
political institutions, and high culture such as the Chinese writing system, Buddhism, 
Confucianism, etc. Because the key influences were multi-faceted and profound, it took a long 
time for Japan to catch up with Korea and then with China.  
“The rice tillage-bronze-iron sequence was much more compressed in Korea than in China, 
and even more so in Japan.”(Totman 2004, p.31) Korea absorbed paddy land culture around 600 
B.C., entered into the Bronze period around 500 B.C., and arrived at the Iron period around 300 
B.C. (Kito 1993, pp.14-7).  Japan absorbed paddy land culture from the third century B.C. to the 
first century A.D., and saw the diffusion of iron farming tools from the second century. It 
introduced the new technology of irrigation from Korea and utilized animal power during the 
fifth and sixth centuries (Tsude 1989). It seems that following this period of transformation, 
Japanese agriculture had attained the same level as Korean agriculture and paddy land culture 
moved ahead of that in Korea. The fallow year for arable land disappeared around the fourteenth 
  6century in Korea. Japan enhanced the stability of paddy land cultivation earlier than Korea and 
even saw the spread of double cropping through the development of irrigation during the 
thirteenth century, by when paddy land productivity was higher in Japan than in Korea. 
It appears that before the introduction of paddy culture in Korea, Japan was more affluent 
and had a higher population density than Korea. This is suggested by the fact that in Korea, 
archaeologists have discovered “less variety in stone and pottery work and less elaboration of 
decorative” artifacts (Totman 2004, p.28). It is highly likely that Korea had a higher population 
density when paddy land culture took root in Korea. Japan’s population in the eighth century is 
estimated at around 5 to 6 million, while an estimate for Korea put the population at about 3 
million in the twelfth century (Park 1996, pp.147-156). Though both estimates do not have a 
firm foundation, it is probable that by the eighth century, population density in Japan became 
higher again than that in Korea. 
Turing to the use of money, Korea has a longer history in using a metal currency than Japan. 
China’s metal money began to circulate in northern Korea before the birth of Christ, while in the 
southern part, iron money circulated probably from the second to the fifth century. However, 
metal money seems to have disappeared during the formation period of territorial states from the 
fourth to the sixth century. Instead, cloth became the main currency. The policy of the Goryeo 
dynasty (918-1392) to circulate coins failed, but a small amount of silver money nevertheless 
circulated for more than two centuries during the dynasty. Repeated attempts to circulate paper 
money and coins during the early Joseon dynasty also met with failure. The Goryeo and Joseon 
governments thought the main obstacles to the policies were a fragile market, a shortage of 
copper, and the active use of cloth money. From the 1590s onward, the influx of silver from 
China and then Japan led to the circulation of silver money, but with the decrease in silver 
imports in the eighteenth century, the use of silver money also declined. In the end, the policy to 
circulate copper coins since 1678 bore fruit, and it spread to most of the country around 1700 
(Lee 2006, chap 3). 
By contrast, Japan saw steady progress toward the development of a market economy since 
the late twelfth century, as evidenced by the growth of urban centers, the specialization of 
merchants and artisans, and the spread of monetization (Yamamura 1990). China’s copper coins 
were in wide circulation and long distance trade flourished by the fifteenth century. The 
development of a market economy attained a higher level during the Tokugawa period. In sum, 
Japan’s lead over Korea was the most conspicuous in the development of a market economy 
from the thirteenth century onward. 
Manufacturing in Japan took more time to catch up with Korea than agriculture and 
  7commerce. The first manufacturing technology in which Japan caught up with Korea seems to 
be that of iron. Japan heavily depended upon iron imports from southern Korea until the fifth 
century and developed iron manufacture by introducing Korean technology from the middle of 
the fifth century to the early sixth century (Wada 1993, p.254). Japan’s iron technology was 
more advanced than Korea’s by the fourteenth century when Japan became famous for sword 
exports. However, the medieval Japan did not go beyond imitating Chinese porcelain, while 
Goryeo Korea absorbed Chinese technology and produced unique and high quality porcelains 
(Murai 1987).  
When did the Japanese economy surpass the Korean economy?  It is not easy to answer this 
question, because the time involved in the catch-up process varied across different spheres of 
economic activity, as mentioned above. Let us have a look at the sixteenth century. The most 
widely accepted population estimates for Korea and Japan in 1590 are 14 million (Kwon and 
Shin 1977) and 12 million, respectively. It seems likely that these figures represent an 
overestimate of Korea’s population and an underestimate of Japan’s population. But what is 
clear is that population density was higher in Korea than in Japan or was at least similar in both 
countries. If there was any century since the eighth in which population density in Korea was 
higher than in Japan, it would be the sixteenth century. Thanks to the development of 
agricultural technology and political stability, Korea’s population increased rapidly during the 
fifteenth century. Korea achieved a gradual reclamation of lowlands, but did not experience 
huge reclamations comparable to those in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Japan, which laid 
a firm foundation for the higher population density in Tokugawa Japan.  
The higher paddy land productivity in Japan than in Korea can be largely attributed to the 
wetter and warmer climate and more fertile soil in Japan. Double cropping was practiced earlier 
in Japan than in Korea because of the warmer and wetter climate. Korean farmers were already 
aware of the practice of transplanting rice from seedbeds instead of direct seeding (?) in 
the fifteenth century, but the Korean government prohibited it because of the small amount of 
rain that fell at the time of transplanting rice. The natural environment could also explain a large 
part of Japan’s lead over Korea in the development of irrigation. The Korean mission to Japan 
was impressed by Japanese water mills (), and the Korean government encouraged their 
use in 1431. Owing to the unavailability of adequate water, however, the Korean government 
decided to use the mill run only by water power, while dispensing with the mill that needed 
human labor.
5 Korea published books on agronomics on its own in the fifteenth century, earlier 
                                                        
5 Joseon wangjo silok (The Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty), King Sejong 11·12 eulhae; 
13·gyeongjin; 13·6 eulmi; 13·10 sinyu; 13·11 byeongjin; 15·4 sinmyo (훢, 11튴 12 瘝; 
  8than in Japan. In addition, the speed of diffusion of cotton culture was not faster in Japan than in 
Korea. Cotton was first introduced to Korea in 1364, and cotton cloth became not only the main 
cloth but also the main commodity money in place of hemp cloth by the early fifteenth century. 
Korean cotton cloth came to Japan from 1406 onward, and it took almost a century from the end 
of the fifteenth century for cotton to diffuse widely (Nagahara 1990). Thus, it can be said that 
Japanese agriculture did not surpass Korean agriculture until the sixteenth century. 
However, Japanese agriculture became more advanced than Korean agriculture following 
the active publication of books on agronomics, improvements of farm tool technology, and the 
increased input of commercial fertilizers. Surprisingly, the number and quality of books on 
agronomics published in Japan during 1680-1697 far surpassed that of those published in Korea 
until this period. Tokugawa Japan also produced farm tools that were superior to those in Korea. 
For example, the one-thousand-tooth thresher that began to be used in the late seventeenth 
century was reputed to be ten times as efficient as the threshing chopsticks that preceded it. 
Finally, in Tokugawa Japan, increased input of commercial fertilizers led to an increase in land 
productivity, something that did not happen in Korea until the nineteenth century. 
In the sixteenth century, despite the higher labor productivity in Japan, it seems that 
Japanese peasants were not better off than Korean peasants.
6 This is because Japanese peasants 
had to bear land taxes at a rate of about 60% of their output, which was far higher than that the 
rate applied to their Korean counterparts. During the Tokugawa period, not only per capita GDP 
but also disposable income increased. The growth rates of wages and per capita GDP in Japan 
were 0.10% and 0.15% respectively during 1700-1870 (Saito 2005), while wages in Korea 
remained stagnant throughout this period (Park 2004). As a result, not only per capita GDP but 
also living standards were higher in late Tokugawa Japan than in Korea during this period. 
Turning to manufacturing technology and science, Japan caught up with Korea during the 
Tokugawa period. Japan achieved a notable development in iron manufacturing technology 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which extended Japan’s technological lead over 
Korea. This provided the basis for the development of the manufacture of agricultural 
implements and mining. Moreover, Japan was able to catch up with Korea in the technology of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
13튴 5 쳒; 13튴 6 ?; 13튴 10 ; 13튴 12 ?; 15튴 4 ?). 
6 According to Oamu Monogatari, the daughter of a samurai that received 300 koku ( 謁) only 
ate gruel morning and evening and had few clothes (Nagahara 1990, pp.2-4). The report (1600) of 
the Korean Confucian scholar Gang Hang (姜沆) who went to Japan as a captive of Hideyoshi’s 
army told a similar story, i.e., that peasants worked very hard, paid all the surplus to the authorities, 
and only ate the hulls of grain and roots of plants (Seoae Seonsaeng Byeoljip (??, Vol. 
4, Miscellaneous writings (). 
  9ceramics and printing, by utilizing Korean technicians captured by Hideyoshi’s army in 1590s. 
As a national market began to form in Japan from the late seventeenth century, the country’s 
cotton industry moved ahead of its Korean counterpart. While Tokugawa Japan saw a 
significant improvement in looms, looms remained almost unchanged in Joseon Korea until the 
mid-nineteenth century (Hayashi 1983; Kwon 1989). Japan’s overall manufacturing 
technologies surpassed those of Korea, based on successful import substitution of cotton cloth, 
high quality porcelain and silk, printing, etc., from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century 
(Kawakatsu 2003). Turning to science, Korea achieved remarkable scientific development from 
the thirteenth to the fifteenth century.  For example, a rain gauge (測雨器) was invented and 
large scale printing by movable type was extensively used in the fifteenth century for the first 
time in the world (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig 1978, p. 310). Japan caught up with Korea 
in science through contact with European science introduced by Dutch traders (蘭學).  
However, the gap in the development of a market economy between two countries was 
considerable already by the early fifteenth century, as mentioned above. It is unique that Korea 
attained a high level of development in technology, science, and culture but remained at a low 
level in terms of the development of a market economy in the fifteenth century.
7   
The above outline suggests that it is almost impossible to determine which economy was 
superior in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. If my evaluation is correct, the Japanese economy 
surpassed the Korean economy at some time during the Tokugawa period. Sengoku and 
Tokugawa Japan achieved dramatic economic development in a pre-modern sense, while Joseon 
Korea experienced slow development. In the early nineteenth century, the Korean economy 
seems to have reached the limits of its development or entered an equilibrium trap at a lower 
level than China’s (Elvin 1973; Lee 2006), while the Japanese economy continued to develop.  
By the mid-nineteenth century, when Korea and Japan were about to open their doors to the 
modern world, the economic gap between the two countries was considerable.  
However, one should also not overlook the achievements Korea and Japan have in common. 
Pre-modern Korea and Japan both managed to develop small peasant economies (Nakamura 
2000). The distinguished American agronomist F. H. King, who traveled across eastern China, 
Korea, and Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century observed that “[…] in agricultural 
                                                        
7 In the early fifteenth century, the Ryukyu Kingdom declared that the principle of its foreign policy 
would be to learn from the superior culture of Korea, to put the relationship with China at the center, 
and to maintain friendly relations with Japan (Takara 1993, pp.85-6). This reveals Korea’s lead over 
Japan in terms of cultural development. However, Japan caught up with Korea in terms of cultural 
development during the Tokugawa period.   
  10methods and appliances the Koreans and Japanese are more closely similar than the Chinese and 
Koreans […]” (Totman 2004, p.1). In the eighteenth century, both Korea and Japan were able to 
support high population densities by pre-modern standard. Although the urbanization rate was 
very low and long-distance trade did not flourish in Joseon Korea, the only place in the world 
outside Western Europe to have achieved the same density of rural periodic markets as Korea 
before 1800 seems to be the advanced regions of China. The development of agricultural 
technology in Korea led to a high population density by the eighteenth century, which in turn 
supported a high density of periodic markets. As in Japan, the diffusion of education in Korea 
was advanced. On the one hand, the economic gap between Japan and Korea is an important 
reason why Japan responded more effectively to the modernization process than Korea after 
opening up to the modern world. On the other hand, the common achievement of the two 
countries may explain why Korea subsequently managed to transform its economy and society 
rapidly relative to most of the other Asian countries. 
 
 
III. Determinants of performance differences between Korea and Japan  
 
The determinants of economic growth or catch-up fall into the following fields: geography; 
international economic relations; the nexus of culture, policy and institutions; and the 
accumulation of technological knowledge, capital, and human and social capabilities. These 
factors are interrelated. Among them, geography is the only exogenous variable.  International 
economic relations encompass trade, capital flows, and transfers of technology and institutional 
knowledge. Culture and policy determine institutions. Economists and historians consider 
geography, trade, and institutions as key determinants of economic growth. 
The term human capabilities (헡) has a wider meaning than human capital. It also 
implies economic rationality, industriousness, the motivation to achieve, deliberation, 
capabilities to respond to challenges, etc.  Education and on-the-job training enhance human 
capabilities by increasing human capital. Human capabilities can also be enhanced by the 
upgrading of social capabilities, or by training and opportunities offered through historical 
change. In the context of East Asian history, salient examples of training and opportunities are 
the Warring States periods in China and Japan, which will be discussed in detail below. It is said 
that human capital is an important factor in determining economic growth, and social 
capabilities are an important factor in realizing catch-up (Abramovitz 1986). Here, I will argue 
that human capabilities provide a more comprehensive explanation for catch-up than social 
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up. 
What factors underlie the common economic development in Korea and Japan, and which 
are responsible for Japan’s superior performance? Table 5 compares the two economies based 
on the exposition in the previous section and provides a summary of the determinants of 
economic performance, which will be discussed below. 
 
Table 5: Comparison of the pre-industrial economies of Korea and Japan 
Periods  Comparison of economies  Important factors of divergence 
Before 600 B.C. 





J more affluent than K  
K more advanced than J 
Same level 
J>K in terms of per capita GDP 
J more advanced than K  
J: More gifts from forest and sea  
Geographical location 
J: Natural environment + Political system 
J: Political system + Human capabilities 
J: Institutions + Market environment 
+ Human capabilities 
Note: “J” stands for Japan and “K” for Korea. “>” means “surpasses.” 
 
Why does Japan seem to have been more affluent than Korea before the introduction of 
paddy cultivation? A likely explanation is that Japan had more gifts from the forest and the sea, 
in other words more resources for collecting, hunting, and fishing (Yasuda 1993).  These were a 
critical advantage in a forager society. Japan’s advantage in terms of resources from the forest 
and the sea continue to exist even to the present. Both countries developed primitive dry land 
agriculture before the introduction of paddy culture.  
It is not difficult to find Korea’s critical advantage in introducing paddy cultivation, bronze 
and iron metallurgy, other manufacturing technologies such as weaving and ceramics, and other 
aspects of high civilization such as the political system and culture. Korea had an advantage in 
geographical location to absorb the advanced civilizations of the Eurasian continent. People 
could move from China to Korea by land, while Japan had been isolated by sea from the 
continent since the final Pleistocene melt-off. Before the seventh century, high civilization that 
Japan absorbed from abroad made its way there mainly via the Korean peninsula. Even in the 
seventh century, the geographical isolation was still a considerable barrier as the vessels of 
Japanese missions to Tang China were often shipwrecked.  
With regard to the rice tillage-bronze-iron sequence, it is only natural that this was much 
more compressed in Korea and Japan than in China, because the former two were able to enjoy 
the advantage of backwardness. The fact that both countries had developed primitive dry land 
agriculture before the introduction of paddy land culture provided the basis of the compression. 
However, we need to find reasons other than the advantage of backwardness to account for the 
fact that the sequence was even more compressed in Japan. One reason must be that the route 
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to Japan. And if the primitive agriculture before paddy culture in Japan was more advanced than 
that in Korea as some Japanese scholars suggest, this would partly account for the more rapid 
compression. 
It is interesting to note that the accumulation of technological knowledge played some role 
in the economic development or catch-up before the introduction of paddy land culture. As the 
accumulation of various factors progressed, their influence on economic development became 
stronger, weakening the binding force of geography.    
How did Japan manage to catch up with Korea? Interestingly, geography or the natural 
environment provided the basis for the catch-up. In addition to advantages in gathering, hunting, 
and fishing since the pre-agricultural period, Japan was also in a favorable position vis-à-vis 
Korea in paddy land cultivation because of ample rain, warmer weather, and more fertile soil. 
Therefore, Japan was able to support a denser population than Korea already by around the 
eighth century. And the more varied climate and topology in Japan provided more favorable 
conditions for the development of internal trade than was the case in Korea (Hayami 2004).   
Although Japan was isolated from the continent by sea, this geographical isolation did not 
prevent an active interchange between the Japanese islands and the Korean peninsula, which 
dates back to the prehistoric period (Okazaki 1993; Yoshino 2004). Hanihara (1987), for 
example, estimates that the number of immigrants to Japan amounted to more than one million 
from the third century B.C. to the eighth century A.D. Unlike many Oceanian islands, the 
geographical location of the Japanese archipelago did not result in a complete isolation from the 
advanced Eurasian civilizations, but did make contact with such civilizations more difficult 
when compared with the Korean peninsula.  
Moreover, the Japanese devised methods to overcome the geographical disadvantage, while 
Korea’s geographical advantage sometimes turned into a disadvantage in the country’s 
economic development. Whereas the Japanese gradually developed technologies to sail the seas, 
the Koreans were passive in maritime affairs from the tenth century onward and early Joseon 
missions to China took the land route instead of the sea route because of frequent wreckages 
(Sukawa 1997). For Japan, on the other hand, a valuable means to overcome the geographical 
disadvantage was the active and efficient utilization of immigrant scholars and technicians 
(풤헎) from the third century B.C. to the eighth century (Wada 1993), which played an 
instrumental role in Japan’s catch-up with Korea. Although Japan had little diplomatic contact 
with the continent from the ninth century onward, it was still able to develop technology and 
industry through the skilful utilization of foreign technicians. For example, in the seventeenth 
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army, while the Nishjin silk industry absorbed the technologies of Chinese weavers in the late 
sixteenth century. Tokugawa Japan was more efficient in absorbing Western civilization 
through Dutch traders than China, not to speak of Korea, despite imposing more severe 
restrictions on exchanges with Westerner. Japan again showed a remarkable capability to utilize 
foreigners embodying advanced civilization since opening its doors to the West in the mid-
nineteenth century. By contrast, Korean history since the Three Kingdoms period has few 
comparable anecdotes until 1882. I remember one significant case, a Chinese, Ssang Gi (雙冀), 
who contributed to establishing the state examination institution in 958.  
In sum, geography and the natural environment had been the main determinants of the 
economic gap between Korea and Japan until the eleventh century. As Reischauer (1982, p.41) 
noted, “Japan’s location and natural endowments helped determine the path the Japanese took, 
but these physical features alone can scarcely account for what they are today.” From the 
twelfth century, Japan “departed from the East Asian norm,” as the power of the central 
government waned and the feudalism developed. “Japan’s feudal culture was in many basic 
ways more like that of feudal Europe than China.”(Reischauer 1982, pp. 52, 56). 
The divergence between Korea and Japan in terms of political institutions was strongly 
influenced by geography, however. First, it was more difficult for Japan to sustain a centralized 
state compared to Korea because of its topography, namely the longer geographic spread of the 
land and the barriers created by high mountains. Second, geopolitics also mattered. Because 
Korea shared a border with China, Koreans had no choice other than to form a strong territorial 
state in order not to be ruled by China. The first territorial state of Korea, Goguryeo became 
strong enough to expel the Chinese commanderies by the fourth century, and the military 
pressure from Goguryeo necessitated the formation of two territorial states in the southern part 
of Korea. Japan did not face such strong external pressure, because it was isolated by the sea 
and almost safe from Chinese or nomadic invasions. 
After the alliance of Tang China and Silla, a territorial state in southeast Korea, managed to 
destroy the other Korean states of Baekje and Goguryeo, the Tang rulers attempted to bring the 
entire Korean peninsula under their imperial control. Silla successfully repulsed the Tang 
invasion in 676. Since then, however, Korea enjoyed peaceful diplomatic relations with China 
for twelve centuries, as compensation for accepting an inferior position under the Chinese 
tribute system. And Joseon Korea became deeply incorporated into the Chinese world order. 
This was mainly because the Korean states shared common borders with their large neighbor. 
By contrast, Japan’s geographic isolation helped it to free itself from the Chinese world order. 
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Korea and Japan in terms of political institutions. 
Easy access to China provided a stimulus for Korea to learn from China’s high civilization. 
Korea had been more ardent and successful in absorbing Chinese pre-modern civilization than 
any other country. At the same time, however, Joseon Korea’s deep incorporation into the 
Chinese world order proved to be a disadvantage in absorbing Western civilization, while 
Japan’s independent position was more favorable in this regard. 
The divergence between Korea and Japan in terms of political institutions and the 
relationship with China may account for a large part of the fact that Japan’s lead over Korea was 
most conspicuous in the development of a market economy from the thirteenth century onward. 
It influenced not only the development of internal markets but also the trend in foreign trade.  
Let me explain the influence on foreign trade first. The pre-modern states in Korea were 
passive in pursuing gains from trade and restrictive on private trade. After becoming 
incorporated into the Chinese tributary system, they subordinated trade to diplomacy, and 
restricted private trade independent of tributary traffic. In addition, state rulers restricted private 
trade activities in order to monopolize the profits from trade and to prevent the rise of local 
centers of power that might threaten the authority of the state. The extension and consolidation 
of the Three Kingdoms around the fifth century shrunk external trade among local powers on 
the Korean peninsula, and transformed the open trade system into an administered trade system 
(Yi 1998). We find no evidence that private maritime trade independent of emissary traffic was 
allowed by the Three Kingdoms. During the ninth century, when the power of the state in 
unified Silla weakened, private trade by Koreans prospered and Silla traders dominated the East 
Asian seas. The lively maritime activity of Korean traders in this period is unique in the pre-
modern history of Korea. In the tenth century, the new Goryeo government also came to 
prohibit private maritime trade independent of emissary traffic. The Joseon government that 
followed at first prohibited all private trade with China. Although the Joseon government 
eventually allowed private trade attendant on tribute missions and authorized border-market 
trade, it did not allow Koreans to go overseas for trade until 1882.  
Korea’s proportion of trade in GDP is estimated to have been about 2.5% during the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This proportion was the highest in Korea before the 
opening of the economy to trade with the modern world. The major reason for this was Korea’s 
role as an entrepôt for transit trade between Japan and China based on the massive inflow of 
Japanese silver. However, trade contracted in the eighteenth century, mainly due to the 
interruption of silver imports from Japan, and the proportion dropped to an estimated 1.5% in 
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about 16% of the world average in 1870 estimated by Maddison (2001). The restrictive trade 
policies, such as maritime bans, are likely to have seriously hindered the development of market 
economy in Korea, given its geographic position as a peninsular country. 
Turning to Japan, the ritsuryo state was as restrictive on private trade as the Korean states. 
As in ninth century Korea, the weakening of state authority and the rise of local rulers in 
eleventh century Japan brought about maritime advances (Tanaka 1975). Overseas trade grew 
steadily from the twelfth to the early seventeenth century. The proportion of trade in GDP is 
estimated to have been about 5% in the early seventeenth century. The gap in foreign trade 
activity was one important reason for Japan’s lead over Korea in the development of a market 
economy until the early seventeenth century. However, after imposing severe restrictions on 
exchanges with Westerners in the 1630s and tight restrictions on the export of silver from the 
late seventeenth century, Japan’s foreign trade declined drastically. The proportion of trade in 
GDP is estimated to have decreased to about 1% in the late seventeenth century, and further to 
about 0.3% in the early nineteenth century.
8 Japan’s proportion of trade in GDP seems to have 
been more than ten times that of the world average in the early seventeenth century, and less 
than one tenth of the world average in the early nineteenth century, considering the proportion 
of merchandise exports in GDP in 1870 and the growth rate in the volume of world trade during 
1500-1870 estimated by Maddison (2001; 2005). From the late seventeenth to the early 
nineteenth century, Japan’s proportion of trade in GDP was lower than that of Korea. Thus, the 
reasons for Tokugawa Japan’s growing lead over Korea must lie in the role played by internal 
markets. 
The divergence in political systems between Korea and Japan brought about differences in 
the evolution and speed of internal market development, because the political system governed 
the system of economic integration. Over the course of history, most economies in the world fall 
into one of three major allocation systems based on the principle of reciprocity, redistribution 
through public finances, or the market.
9 Based on this categorization, a country’s system of 
                                                        
8 Nishikawa (1985, p.45) estimated the proportion of exports in farm output (췔). The 
estimated farm output in 1872 was 1.8 times the rice output in 1874 estimated by the Meiji 
government. As the proportion of rice output valued at market prices in GNP was 24% in Japan 
during 1885-8, farm output in 1872 is computed to have been 43% of GDP. The Meiji government 
seems to have slightly underestimated the rice output in 1874, and the proportion of rice output to 
GNP seems to have slightly decreased during 1872-1888 because of industrialization. Thus, I 
estimate the proportion of farm output to GDP in 1872 as around 40%. It was higher in early 
Tokugawa Japan. 
9 This categorization of major principles of economic allocation was first formulated by Polayni 
(1944). North (1977) accepted this categorization, and explained changes in the system of economic 
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the three allocation systems. 
In general, redistribution plays a stronger role in integrating an pre-industrial economy in 
centralized states than in feudal societies. In Korea, the consolidation of the state from the Three 
Kingdoms period to the early Joseon period meant that redistribution came to play the dominant 
role in the system of economic integration. The early Joseon state consolidated and expanded 
the redistribution system and suppressed trade activities (Sukawa 2000). In sum, the centralized 
state in Korea did not provide favorable conditions for development of internal and external 
markets. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth century there was a growth in markets, mainly 
owing to population increase.  
By contrast, the prolonged feudal period in Japan was not unfavorable to the development 
of the internal market (Reischauer 1970, pp.72-7; Ishii 2003, chaps. 3 and 4). As the rtsuryo 
state disintegrated, the allocational role of redistribution declined and feudal lords had greater 
freedom to sell peasants’ surplus in their private estates, or shoen (), that were gradually 
released from the taxing and administrative authority during the Heian period (794-1185). Trade 
between the private estates and in the capital region of Kyoto, Nara, and several satellite cities 
and port towns provided merchants and artisans with internal markets bigger than before and 
consequently than in medieval Korea (Sasaki 1972; Yamamura 1990).  
It cannot be said that the formation of centralized states in Korea had only negative 
economic consequences. The Joseon government tried to stabilize the peasant economy and 
encourage agricultural activity by imposing a low tax rate, by improving irrigation, and by 
publishing and distributing books on agronomics. This role of the government may account in 
part for the rapid diffusion of cotton culture mentioned earlier. In addition, the government 
played a leading role in the remarkable scientific development in the fifteenth century. 
I mentioned in the previous section that the level of economic development in Korea was 
not so different from that of Japan around the fifteenth century. This was because the 
geographical and other advantages and disadvantages more or less offset each other. The tide 
was on the side of Japan, however, because the role of the market as an engine of economic 
growth was far stronger in Japan than in Korea. Moreover, from the late Warring States 
(Sengoku) period to the early Tokugawa period, Japan experienced important institutional 
changes that laid the foundation for dramatic economic development, which no one in Japan 
could conceive at the time.  
During the Warring States period of Japan, “a new type of tightly organized feudal domains 
                                                                                                                                                                    
integration by a theory of transaction cost. 
  17grew.” Territorial lords, or daimyo, came to gain a firm control of clearly defined domains. The 
domains (쿐) were autonomous political entities that resembled the nation state in early 
modern Europe. By the end of the sixteenth century, there formed a centralized feudal state. 
Under the Tokugawa state a supreme overlord, the shogun, maintained rule over hundreds of 
vassal lords, the daimyo (Reischauer 1982).  
The fierce military struggles during the Warring States period from the mid-fifteenth to the 
early seventeenth century resulted in the development of an efficient tax system. Around 1600, 
the daimyo absorbed about half the farm output in the form of rice. Although the tax rate in 
Japan was far higher than in Korea, the tax structure was simpler and fairer. This, in effect, was 
the outcome of the need for the daimyo to devise an efficient system to extract the maximum 
amount of tax in order to fund their military campaigns.
10 So they supported the self-reliance of 
small peasant economies and extracted all the peasants’ surplus (꫎췸). Since tax 
reforms in the early eighteenth century, the amount of tax to be paid remained almost constant, 
providing peasants with an incentive to produce more (Iwahashi 1988). 
Korea also created an efficient tax structure in the seventeenth century, but could not 
prevent the expansion of informal taxes and illegal usurpation in addition to formal and legal 
taxes. While increases in land productivity provided peasants with a growing surplus in 
Tokugawa Japan, any increases in productivity in Korea were accompanied by significant 
increases in informal taxes and illegal usurpation. Thus, the gap in the ratio of the total tax 
burden to farm output between Korea and Japan narrowed in the eighteenth and the early 
nineteenth century, because increases in land productivity were slower and increases in 
additional taxes larger in Korea.  
“The central Tokugawa administration in Edo developed into a large bureaucracy, and the 
domains followed the same general pattern and trends of development.”(Reischauer 1982, p. 
64) The Tokugawa administrative structure was never fully rationalized (Jansen and Rozman 
1986, p.16), however, unlike those of Korea and China. Thus, how was Tokugawa Japan able to 
better manage the taxation issue than China and Korea? One important reason is that the socio-
political system of Tokugawa Japan entailed fewer agency and free rider problems in taxation 
than those of Korea and China. The strict and efficient taxation levied on village communities 
() mitigated the free rider problem, because villagers knew the tax-bearing capacity of 
                                                        
10 During the Late Three Kingdoms period of Korea (901-935), one among their rulers enforced a 
30% land tax. However, the founder of the Goryeo dynasty lowered this to 10%. The land tax rate of 
the early Joseon dynasty was lower than that of the former dynasty. The fierce military struggles in 
Korea brought forth a tax system similar to that of Sengoku Japan, while the advent of peace under a 
centralized state resulted in the adoption of the Chinese tax system.  
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segregation of the ruling class (?) from rural villages. By contrast, in Korea, the privileged 
yanban (?) class was the major free rider in taxation. It was more difficult for officers in 
Tokugawa Japan to illegally extract peasants’ surplus beyond the officially determined tax 
amount, because the daimyo with their relatively small territories were able to supervise their 
tax collectors more easily than Korean kings, and because the villages were allowed a 
considerable degree of autonomy in assigning and collecting taxes. Although Korean kings were 
very much concerned about the conduct of local officials, their ability to keep corruption in 
check was limited. And while the use of formal rules in the evaluation of bureaucrats was more 
widespread in Korea, dishonest officials were sometimes punished more severely in Japan. The 
institution of the shori (ퟙ), an official charged with simple administrative duties, aggravated 
the agency problem in Korea and China, because they received no formal salaries.   
As private economic relations and activities spread, various property rights came into being 
during late medieval Japan (Sakurai 1996). The early modern authorities of Japan suspended 
various property rights, but developed usufructuary rights (쿭). They denied the property 
right of land, but guaranteed the usufruct of peasants, unless peasants neglected their tax 
duties.
11 The effective guarantee of usufructs probably is an important factor in explaining the 
success in the huge reclamation of new land (Oishi 1977). Tokugawa Japan guaranteed mining 
usufructs more effectively than Joseon Korea and also enforced trade usufructs (?) in 
the late eighteenth century. Although Joseon Korea developed private property rights for land, 
the expansion of informal taxes and illegal usurpation encroached on it. And while Korea also 
had usufructs of land cultivation, mining, and trade, it did not institutionalize and guarantee 
them effectively. The usufructs seem to have formed with various contract systems (?) in 
feudal Japan. There appeared mandated official work such as tax farming by local elites 
(쿐?꫈꫎?) in the late ninth and early tenth century when the ritsuryo state in Japan 
began to disintegrate (Katsuyama 1995). 
The Joseon centralized state was inefficient in promoting regional development because of 
the agency problem. Although increases in population and the prosperity of agriculture were 
included in the criteria based on which the performance of local officials was evaluated, it 
seems that it would have been a rational choice for local officials not to actively promote long-
term policies for regional development. These policies often required the mobilization of rural 
                                                        
11 Peasants in land registries who were obliged to pay taxes were called naukenin (?), which 
means “contractors to pay the taxes.”   
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emphasized the stability of peasant economies and rural society (?). Moreover, most local 
officials did not like to promote long-term policies, because their term of office was usually 
short. By contrast, Japan’s daimyo had a strong incentive to encourage regional development, 
because they were not agents but owners of the domains. Moreover, they were locked in 
competition with each other in the form of military competition during the Warring States period 
and in the form of economic competition during the Tokugawa period. Therefore, they 
supported the huge reclamation of new land and promoted local specialty production to enrich 
their domains. In the late eighteenth century, the domain governments introduced new products 
and encouraged production by improving technology and supplying raw materials and capital to 
producers. 
The peace and political stability that Japan enjoyed for more than two centuries following 
the reestablishment of national unity by Tokugawa Ieyasu also provided favorable conditions 
for institutional stability and market expansion (Iwahashi 1988). It must not be overlooked, 
however, that the longer peace of Joseon dynasty did not engender a comparable economic 
development. This was because of differences in institutions and economic system, as 
mentioned above. Tokugawa Japan had another advantage in the form of a strong state 
(쳣쿐쪫) that had the ability to execute policies against the opposition of interest groups. Not 
only market conditions but also proactive policies by the Tokugawa bakufu ensured the 
unification of weights and measures in the seventeenth century. By contrast, the weaker Joseon 
state was unable to do the same and had difficulties in bringing copper coins into wide 
circulation. 
Compared to Joseon Korea, institutional weaknesses in Tokugawa Japan were laws 
prohibiting land sales and limiting labor mobility, heavy tax rates, and the extravagant system of 
alternate residence which required the daimyo to spend alternate years in Edo (탌컟폛). As 
markets grew, however, land could be sold and people enjoyed a considerable degree of 
mobility (Hayami 1993). Surprisingly, the heavy tax and the system of alternate residence had 
significant positive effects in the historical context of Tokugawa Japan, as will be elaborated 
below.  
Because the domains tended to be self-contained economic units, taxes were collected in 
rice instead of money, and overseas trade was severely restricted by the bakufu, the market 
economy contracted during the formation period of the centralized feudal system. However, 
these arrangements held one big advantage that more than offset the disadvantages: I would 
argue that the most significant determinant of the economic gap between Japan and Korea was 
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that it created a “small world economy” (﫾 춣쳨) in which each domain behaved like 
a small state (Lee 1999). Not only did the military powers that united Japan abolish transit 
duties between domains and trade monopolies (Ishii 2003, pp.41-4), but the authority of the 
bakufu also guaranteed the safety of transactions between domains. Based on these institutional 
foundations, the “small world economy” could be well integrated by the Osaka market. While 
Japanese scholars used to characterize the development of markets in Tokugawa Japan as the 
formation of a national market from the viewpoint of a nation, I think we should pay attention to 
the market environment governed by the centralized feudal system. 
While the daimyo could integrate the economies of their domains mainly through 
redistribution, economic relations between the center and the domains, and between domains, 
had to depend on market exchange. As a result, there formed a national market that in the late 
seventeenth century depended mainly on rice taxes. This was in sharp contrast with Joseon 
Korea, where the government was able to integrate the whole country to a considerable degree 
through redistribution. Unlike Tokugawa Japan, Joseon Korea had a big and elaborate system of 
grain loans (ﲽ췚) which provided major funds for public relief in times of bad harvests, and an 
important financial source for many offices in times of good harvest. The amount of grain loans 
increased to about six million koku of unhulled rice in the late eighteenth century (Lee 1999).  
The system of alternate residence forced the domains to be integrated into the “small world 
economy.” It required the domains to produce excess rice or specialized local crops for sale in 
order to provide materials for the residence of the daimyo and their families in Edo. By the end 
of the seventeenth century, rice taxes amounting to as much as 1–1.4 million koku entered 
Osaka, the center of this “small world economy.” The heavy tax and the extravagant system of 
alternate residence that might otherwise have been detrimental to economic development played 
a positive role in the formation of the “small world economy.” 
As the market grew, villagers increasingly shifted to commercial farming. The increase in 
peasant households and the stabilization and commercialization of the peasant economies 
around the seventeenth century provided a firm foundation for the development of markets in 
Tokugawa Japan. By the late eighteenth century, the main impetus for market expansion came 
from commercial agriculture and rural industry instead of commodities converted from rice 
taxes. In other words, the predominance of markets over redistribution in the economic system 
became apparent.
12 The “small world economy” fostered great merchant houses. Competition 
                                                        
12 Hayami (2004) characterizes “economic society” as one in which economic rationality prevails, 
and argues that the “economization of society” began from the fifteenth century and covered the 
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from the political powers. The daimyo at first tried to establish self-contained economic units 
like the Joseon rulers, but under the alternate residence system and in the expanding national 
market had no choice other than to act in a fashion similar to the mercantile rulers of Europe. 
The daimyo contributed to the expansion of the market whose functioning was still immature by 
pouring the peasant surplus into the Osaka market, and subsequently, to the development of 
agricultural and industrial production by promoting production for import substitution and 
export. The varied climate and topology, and the commercial and industrial domain policies 
under the “small world economy” brought about the proliferation of local production centers 
and the flourishing trade between them.  
Thanks to this “small world economy,” Tokugawa Japan achieved dramatic economic 
development despite the very restrictive trade policy which allowed little foreign trade. This 
internally competitive and externally protective market was favorable to successful import 
substitution of goods from other Asian countries. By contrast, the same restrictive trade policy 
and the consequent little foreign trade in Joseon Korea exerted a serious constraint not only on 
market expansion but also on technological development. Interestingly, the economic gap 
between Korea and China had narrowed until the Unified Silla period (668-918) when Korea 
promoted foreign exchange actively, but this trend did not continue during the Goryeo and 
Joseon periods when Korea became less active in foreign exchange. This is revealed in the 
technology for silk fabrics and porcelain, representative products in pre-modern East Asia (Lee 
2003). Korea was not able to make good use of the opportunity to export cotton cloth to Japan 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, because the government monopolized the trade of cotton 
cloth that was collected as tax in order to utilize official trade for diplomatic purposes. Joseon 
Korea was not able to utilize the heritage of scientific development such as printing effectively 
because of low market development. 
If Ieyasu had established a completely centralized state while maintaining the Tokugawa 
government’s restrictive trade policy, Japan’s economic evolution might have followed a similar 
course as that of Joseon Korea or Ming China. However, he was not able to establish a 
centralized state, because the warriors had taken root widely and firmly in Japan since the 
disintegration of the ritsuryo regime. Korea’s elites proposed and discussed changes in policy 
and institutions following the devastating invasion of Hideyoshi’s army. But radical proposals to 
foster commerce, increase government revenue, and strengthen the military met with strong 
                                                                                                                                                                    
whole of Japan by the seventeenth century. I would define “economic society” as a system of 
economic integration where the market prevails and argue that it became established with the “small 
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society. Although the Korean government did implement some reforms, the basic policy 
principles remained unchanged until Korea opened its doors to the modern world. Thus, path 
dependency matters greatly in the history of both countries. 
Korea’s economic development faced exogenous disadvantages when compared with Japan, 
such as possessing a smaller territory, fewer resources, a less favorable climate, and less fertile 
soils for agriculture. These disadvantages would have been surmountable, if Korea had created 
more efficient institutions and more favorable market conditions. But Tokugawa Japan had more 
efficient institutions and more favorable market conditions than Korea. It is not surprising that 
the economic gap between them widened.  
The late Tokugawa economy drew level with the economy of China’s advanced regions, and 
Japan was more successful than China in introducing modern sciences and industries after 
opening its doors to the modern world (Ma and Zhong 1988). It is difficult to understand how 
Japan caught up with China which had a far bigger market and less restrictive class mobility.
13 
The benefits from the “small world economy” of Tokugawa Japan offset the disadvantage of the 
smaller market. This “small world economy” under the centralized feudal system stimulated 
trade and competition among domains and the central city as well as technology transfer 
between regions (Oka, Yamasaki, and Niwa, 1991). Although the feudalistic system of 
Tokugawa Japan imposed some limitations on the integration of the whole market, it brought 
forth the mercantile policy of the domains. The more rapid development of the market in 
Tokugawa Japan than in Qing China illustrates the significance of the latter advantage  in the 
pre-industrial period when market functioning was immature.  
Although people’s occupations and aspirations were limited by hereditary class restrictions 
in Tokugawa Japan, an effective system of reward for merit and achievement did exist in the 
form of opportunities to move to a higher status within each class. If peasants worked and 
studied hard, they had the opportunity not only to become wealthy but also to move to a higher 
status such as shoya (), kumigashira (퓩), or hyakushodai (?폛). As for merchants, 
they could find reward for merit and achievement thanks to large urban markets and the “small 
world economy.” They developed not only commercial skills but also a culture distinct from 
that of the ruling samurai class. As a result of such upward mobility, by the late Tokugawa era, 
there were a large number of intellectuals even among the upper layer of merchants and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
world economy.”  
13 China’s bigger market should have been a distinct advantage, as suggested by Adam Smith’s 
famous proposition “That the Division of Labour is limited by the Extent of the Market” (Smith 
1776, title of Chapter III).   
  23peasants and printing was in wide use (Yamaguchi 1993). By contrast, mobility between classes 
in Ming and Qing China was not necessarily favorable to economic development, because 
commercial capital tended to be invested in land purchases and cultural expenditure once the 
descendants of merchants became officials and then members of the aristocracy (Park 2002). 
The “small world economy” and upward mobility in Tokugawa Japan were able to offset the 
disadvantage of smaller size of the market and the absence of mobility between classes when 
compared to Qing China. However, it is uncertain that these advantages exceeded the 
disadvantages. I would suggest that the missing element in Japan’s catch-up with China is 
human capabilities. Tokugawa Japan had achieved a dramatic development in education (Dore 
1965), and came to surpass Korea and China in the spread of education. Human capabilities 
played a significant role in Japan’s superior performance in modernization (Minami and 
Makino 2002, pp. 11-3). Intellectuals displayed high capabilities in absorbing modern science, 
the  samurai successfully created a modern government, competent entrepreneurs and 
technicians appeared to create modern industry, traditional small firms became competent 
exporters, and traditional agricultural made the transition to modern standards. 
There are various sources for Japan’s catch-up in human capabilities. The reason why 
human capabilities in Tokugawa Japan surpassed those in Joseon Korea can be sufficiently 
explained simply by pointing to the differences in market opportunities. Because of the greater 
market opportunities in Japan, peasants and merchants had more incentive to acquire and 
develop professional skills. By contrast, a weaker market and a stronger Confucian culture in 
Korea meant that the role of economic rationality was weaker under the stronger emphasis on 
Confucian morals such as benevolence and justice.  
The centralized feudal system and the “small world economy” in Tokugawa Japan provided 
a more favorable environment to develop human capabilities than the political arrangements and 
systems of economic integration in pre-modern Korea and China. This “small world economy” 
under the centralized feudal system contributed to the development of merchants’, artisans’, and 
peasants’ capabilities by stimulating economic competition and technology transfer between 
regions.
14 As mentioned above, thanks to the “small world economy” and the reward system in 
                                                        
14 An illustration is provided by Uchida (1960), who, focusing on the development of the textile 
industry in Tokugawa Japan, showed that the learning of foreign technologies, growth of the market, 
competition between regions, promotion and support by governments, and the active response of 
technicians and producers all played an important part and that this accumulation of technology and 
human capabilities laid the foundation for the transformation of traditional textile manufacturing 
into a modern industry once Japan opened its ports. Moreover, Ahn (2004) has shown that the gap in 
the development of the cotton industry between Japan, China, and Korea before the opening to 
modern 
world significantly shaped the performance in the subsequent modernization of the cotton industry.  
  24rural communities, Tokugawa Japan under the absence of class mobility saw a wider spread of 
education among merchants and peasants than Qing China or Joseon Korea. Bureaucrats under 
the centralized feudal system in Japan developed capabilities to reform institutions and respond 
to economic opportunities better than those under the loose administration of the centralized 
states in China and Korea. Bureaucrats’ capabilities revealed themselves in the reforms after the 
opening of these three countries to the modern world. Tokugawa Japanese had more 
opportunities to practice not only cooperation through strong village communities and tightly-
controlled domains, but also competition through the “small world economy.” 
I would argue that the Warring States (Sengoku) period of Japan laid the foundation for the 
remarkable accumulation of human capabilities in Tokugawa period. Table 2 shows that Japan 
achieved significant economic growth in the seventeenth century, before the national market 
was formed. The publication of many books on agronomics during 1680-1697 cannot simply be 
considered as a response to the market, because the national market had just formed in this 
period. The huge reclamation of new land began in the period of fierce strife between the 
Sengoku  daimyo. Sengoku and early Tokugawa Japan made the impressive achievement of 
developing iron technology that provided the basis for agricultural development. Since the 
Warring States period, the samurai displayed their ability to reclaim new land and construct 
castle towns by developing skills in engineering and construction, and had accumulated 
agricultural knowledge that laid the foundation for the era of books on agronomics during 1680-
1697 (Oishi 1977; Oka et. al., 1991, pp.48-52). Moreover, the samurai, familiar with 
competition in military terms, were better prepared for economic competition than the literati 
classes of Korea and China. Japanese peasants achieved high labor productivity already around 
1600, not only because land per capita was relatively large, but also because they worked very 
hard in order to pay the heavy taxes to the ruthless Sengoku warriors. Tokugawa peasants not 
only worked very hard, but also enhanced work efficiency with the aid of agronomical books 
and the opportunities of a growing market (Saito 2005). Moreover, the opportunities of the 
“small world economy” instilled a sense of economic rationality in them.  
The Warring States periods of both ancient China and medieval Japan offered both training 
and opportunity to develop human capabilities. These periods not only imposed a strong degree 
of strain in the fight for survival, but also provided people with opportunities to move to a 
higher social status. Military campaigns during both periods required high technological and 
organizational skills. The Warring States period of ancient China is well known for its great 
achievements in terms of economic growth, intellectual outburst, and political development. 
Although the enhancement of human capabilities in the Warring States period of medieval Japan 
  25was not as great as that of ancient China, Japan continued to develop human capabilities more 
successfully than China after its Warring States period. Japan’s success in import substitution of 
Asian goods before opening its doors to the modern world, and in import substitution and export 
competition with Western countries since then, were underpinned by the continued enhancement 
of human capabilities since the Warring States period.  
This being said, however, differences in human capabilities among the three Northeast 
Asian countries should also not be exaggerated. The spread of education and the development of 
scholarship and science were also common in China and Korea. The development of science 
and education was impressive in Joseon Korea, considering the low level of market 
development.
15 The fact that all three Northeast Asian countries developed human capabilities 
has something to do with common features in terms of the development of intensive agriculture, 
markets, the bureaucracy, and high culture, including Confucianism. The spread of 
Confucianism engendered an ethic of learning and achievement in all three countries. It 
stimulated the development of education and intellectual culture in Tokugawa Japan (Minamoto 
1995, pp. 10-1). In sum, any factor alone is not sufficient to explain Tokugawa Japan’ catch up 
with China.  
 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks  
 
Geography or the natural environment, either directly or indirectly, had mainly determined 
the economic gap between Korea and Japan until the eleventh century. Geography was more 
favorable for Korea in terms of access to the Agricultural Revolution and for Japan in terms of 
access to the Industrial Revolution. From the twelfth century, divergence in the political systems 
of Korea and Japan, a development that was influenced fundamentally by geography, brought 
forth differences in institutions and the system of economic integration. The influence of these 
differences on the economic gap became stronger, weakening the determining force of 
geography. And Tokugawa Japan increasingly enjoyed advantages not only in terms of the 
natural environment, but also in terms of institutions and the system of economic integration 
over Korea, which led to a persistent widening of the economic gap between the two countries. 
Korea was not able to overcome the disadvantages of its small size and poor resource 
endowments until the 1960s, when it successfully embarked on its export-driven growth. From 
the Warring States period onward, Japan developed human capabilities more successfully than 
                                                        
 
15 A study addressing this point is that by Kimura (1997), who regarded educational development as 
a pre-condition for Korea’s take-off.   
  26Korea and China. Japan was more successful in introducing modern civilization after opening 
its doors to the Western world, partly because it benefited from the historical heritage of market 
development and human capabilities.  
Scholars have long argued that the feudal system was a common historical underpinning of 
modernization in both Europe and Japan. This paper finds that the political system played a 
significant role in the evolution of institutions and the system of economic integration. And it 
may be said that feudal societies needed a political or institutional transformation comparable to 
those of Japan and Western Europe around the sixteenth century in order to lay effective 
foundations for modern economic growth.
16 I have argued that the “world economy” as a system 
of economic integration was a common favorable heritage that helped both Japan and Europe to 
achieve modern growth earlier than other regions.  
Viewed from an alternative perspective, Japan and Korea seem to have trodden a similar 
path of economic development, owing to similar natural environments, their geographic 
proximity, and active exchange between them. The period in which the income gap between two 
countries reached a factor of two or more lasted only about a century in the long span of the 
whole of human history.
17 
Early modern Japan was economically backward relative to early modern Western Europe 
(Saito 2005). Reasons for this are that China, the major source of high civilization in pre-
modern East Asia fell behind Western Europe in the early modern period and that the Japanese 
“world economy” was far smaller than the European “world economy” and Europeans actively 
searched for markets outside Europe. In sum, Japan had an advantage over Korea, but a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis Europe in terms of market environment.  
Therefore, incorporation into the modern world economy provided a great opportunity for 
Japan as well as Korea. Foreign trade and markets developed rapidly, and modern technology 
and institutions were introduced widely both in Japan and Korea. Although Japan was more 
successful in modernization, Korea also experienced a significant transformation after opening 
its doors to the modern world. Two reliable estimates of colonial Korea’s regional account’s 
                                                        
16 Although the political system of Mughal India resembled the centralized feudal system of 
Tokugawa Japan, Mughal India did not achieve impressive economic development comparable to 
that of Tokugawa Japan. The history of Mughal India reveals that the political system such as a 
feudalist or centralized feudalist political system did not automatically guarantee success on the road 
to modernization. When compared to Tokugawa Japan, Mughal India had some weaknesses in 
institutions, its economy was not efficiently integrated by the market, and its culture and society 
were not favorable to the accumulation of human capabilities.   
17 According to Maddison (2003), Japan’s per capita GDP was almost or more than twice as large as 
that of Korea or South Korea during 1939-91. However, estimates by Fukao, Ma and Yuan (2006) 
  27(Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988; Kim 2006) have come to the similar conclusion that sustained 
growth of more than 3% began in the earliest years included in these estimates, i.e., around 
1911-12. Although the two studies may overestimate the growth rate in the early 1910s, the 
results reveal that the time when sustained growth of more than 3% began is likely to be not far 
from 1910, the year of colonization. The historical heritage in Korea before colonization seems 
to have provided the foundation for the march to sustained growth led by the introduction of 
Japanese administration, capital, and technology. 
In the late twentieth century, Japan caught up with Europe, while Korea and China became 
newly industrialized countries. The history of Northeast Asia shows that institutions, the market 
environment, and human capabilities have been important factors in determining economic 
development. These factors are interrelated and mutually supportive of each other. In addition, 
it seems that human capabilities have played an important role in the catch-up of the three Asian 
countries. What remains to be done is to explore the various sources of the development of 
human capabilities, such as human capital, social capabilities, and other factors more fully. 


























                                                                                                                                                                    
suggest that the time when Japan’s per capita GDP became more than twice as large as that of Korea 
goes back to the remoter past. 
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